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When William Clark stepped off a steamboat
at Jefferson Barracks, just below St. Louis, in
September 1832, he figured he had finally won.
Clark, Indian Commissioner for the region, took the
Sauk chief Keokuk and his entourage to the barracks
prison to visit the latest arrivals, Black Hawk and a
half-dozen of his fellow leaders. Clark and Keokuk
knew they were in the midst of a new era of relations
between the native peoples and the expanding United
States. All three leaders—William Clark, Keokuk,
and Black Hawk—thought they were promoting
the best interests of Native Americans, too. During
the 1820s, Clark had come around to the view that
proximity to whites was hindering the process of
“civilization”—making the Indians in the white
man’s image—and that clearly the Indians needed to
relocate away from the corrupting influences of white
society where they could grow and evolve—become
“civilized”—at their own pace. American officials
like Clark and Lewis Cass held that the federal
government was obliged to provide everything
needed to facilitate the process; Clark believed the
move should come of mutual consent, whereby the
Indians agreed to move and to an agreeable location.
Thanks to William Clark, Keokuk had risen
to a position of prominence and leadership among
the Sauks. Clark supported the rising Sauk leader
with gifts and supplies that he could take back to
the tribe, solidifying his position there. He was
among the Native American leaders Clark took
back to Washington to meet the president. There,
Keokuk became convinced that American expansion
was inevitable, that whites were too numerous to
resist, and that survival depended on figuring out
how to accommodate them. By decade’s end, the
Sauk leader was squarely in the American camp
and held substantial (but not total) control within
his community. Black Hawk, by contrast, held fast
to traditional views. He had a strong connection
to the land in northwestern Illinois, distrusted the
Americans, and felt that the Sauk should never
succumb to American lifestyles, alcohol, clothes, or
dictates. Yet these three men came together in 1832
at the prison at Jefferson Barracks as symbols of
fundamental changes under way. When they stood
at the barracks on that fall day, they represented a
critical change in the relations between the United
States and the Native American tribes it had pushed
farther and farther west, as proof that the United
States government would stop at nothing to spread its

By the time George Catlin painted this portrait, William
Clark had been overseeing relations between western tribes
and the United States government for almost a quarter of a
century. In Washington, officials generally thought of Clark
and Secretary of War (and former Michigan territorial
governor) Lewis Cass as perhaps the most knowledgeable
federal officials on tribal affairs. (Image: National Museum
of American Art)

wings and people across the continent. How did they
get here, how did it end up like this, and what did it
mean for future relations between the United States
and the tribes?
The roots of the problem stretched to the “three
flags ceremony” in St. Louis in March 1804. It really
wasn’t much, as ceremonies go, although the impact
of the transfer of Louisiana to the United States
was profound. Spain symbolically transferred the
territory to France, which then transferred it to the
United States the following day. Among the highestranking American military officials on hand were
Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, cocommanders of the Corps of Northwest Discovery.
But Lewis and Clark weren’t the only foreign
dignitaries in town when the transfer took place. Also
on hand was a delegation of Sauk and Fox Indians,
most likely including a warrior named Black Sparrow
Hawk, in town to settle a dispute over the murder of
some white settlers by four Sauk hunters the previous

Left–Black Hawk came to symbolize the fight over land ownership between the tribes and the United States government and
the problems with former treaties. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
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When the United States purchased Louisiana from France,
a ceremony in St. Louis in March of 1804 symbolized
the land transfer in upper Louisiana. Often referred to as
the “three flags ceremony,” the land was transferred from
Spain to France, then from France to the United States.
Black Hawk was almost certainly on hand for it, as was
Capt. Meriwether Lewis, Clark’s co-captain in the Corps of
Discovery, which was encamped across the river in Illinois.
(Image: Missouri History Museum)

year.1
The event historians call “Black Hawk’s War”
was the culmination of almost three decades of
strained relations with the Sauk and Fox tribes in
northwestern Illinois and eastern Iowa; for most
of that time, William Clark was a central player
representing the interests of the United States. It was
a relationship that tested not only Clark’s natural
patience but everything he had learned as well. Clark
had signed more treaties with Native Americans than
perhaps any other white American—some negotiated
with tribal leaders, others imposed upon them—and
had generally opposed using force. By the time
Andrew Jackson took office in March 1829, Clark
had a long-standing reputation for civil firmness in
dealing with western Indians, and as the one man
they were most likely to trust and listen to. Indeed,
a main reason he lost the gubernatorial election in
Missouri in 1820 was the perception outside St. Louis
that he was “soft” on Indians. Yet Black Hawk never
trusted the Americans, and that included the RedHeaded Chief in St. Louis, no matter what Keokuk
and others said. The two men—and their respective
peoples—had a turbulent relationship for a quarter
of a century that grew more so after 1822. Black
Hawk and his so-called “British band” challenged
the United States at decade’s end, ultimately leading
Clark to support attacking the troublesome subset
of Sauks and chasing them down like dogs as they
sought to retreat west across the Mississippi. Black
Hawk’s War represents one of the great paradoxes
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of William Clark: How and why could and did he
come to his position in 1831 and 1832? Ultimately,
it brings to sharp focus the fact that Clark found
himself truly straddling two worlds and two sets of
priorities—his belief in progress and the advance of
civilization as white settlers moved westward into
the frontier and the government’s duty to facilitate a
peaceful transition, while at the same time wrestling
with his own views about handling the native peoples
living there.
Part of the issue is that Black Hawk—and the
federal government’s response to his actions of 1831
and 1832—speaks to the different views of Indians
held on either side of the Appalachians. Easterners
(and especially northeastern thinkers), now largely
distanced from direct and regular experience with
indigenous peoples, had come to see them as “noble
savages,” childlike victims who required care and
patience from the United States government. So
long as easterners from the New England and the
mid-Atlantic states like James Monroe, John Quincy
Adams, and their administrations dominated the
executive branch, federal policy and actions would
reflect a desire to continue acquiring Indian lands in
the West while providing tools and mechanisms to
“civilize” the Indians in their new western homes.
But Andrew Jackson represented a completely
different mindset that was more typical of westerners.
He saw Native Americans as “morally depraved,
diabolically cruel killers of innocent white women
and children, and brutish, subhuman obstacles
to the advancement of republican civilization.”
William Clark was one of the few men straddling
this intellectual chasm. He thought more like an
easterner, but he lived and had extensive experience
in the West. This hybridization of lessons learned,
vast experience, and regional viewpoints led Clark
to recommend and support a military solution to the
“Black Hawk problem.”
The relationship between the Sauk and Fox and
the United States got off on the wrong foot almost
immediately. Changes in political status, Americans
cozying up with the dreaded Osage, a dubious
land purchase, and a potential threat to the Sauks’
lucrative fur trade with Europeans made tribal leaders
uneasy.
Now, Indiana governor William Henry Harrison
imposed a new treaty on the Sauks. At the time of the
treaty, the allied tribes claimed substantial territory
on both sides of the Mississippi River spanning
present-day southwestern Wisconsin, northwestern
Illinois, and eastern and central Iowa.2 Their main
settlement was at Saukenuk, just up the Rock River
from the Mississippi in Illinois, where women grew

corn and other agricultural products and chiefs
orchestrated hunts, commerce, and foreign relations.
Exactly what transpired (and why) remains open
to conjecture, and whether it included Harrison’s
liberality with promises and liquor or the chiefs’
thinking that they were merely normalizing economic
relations with the new Americans, the resulting treaty
turned out to become a source of misunderstanding
and, ultimately, Black Hawk’s War.3
To us looking back at 1804 from today, it seems
like a formula for disaster. The problem all stemmed
from the land boundaries. The Sauks gave to the
United States all their land east of the Mississippi.
But Article VII permitted the Sauks to live on the
land “as long as these lands remained the property
of the United States.” To the Americans, this meant
the Sauks could live there as long as it was federal
land, but once the government surveyed it and
sold tracts to homesteaders (as it did in fall 1829),
the Sauks and Fox would have to move across the
Mississippi River to present-day Iowa and never
return.4 It seems unlikely that the chiefs fully
understood the implications of this clause; while they
had extensive dealings with whites for more than a
century, those relations with Europeans had never
pertained to land ownership, and they probably saw
this as “a purely formal gesture of extending United
States protection over a substantial party of their
territory.”5 Regardless, when the delegation returned
to Saukenuk, they continued to live on the land,
plant and harvest corn, and bury their dead, just like
they always had. The relationship became stormy in
subsequent years. Like a number of western tribes,
the Sauks joined the British in the War of 1812.
At war’s end, Secretary of War (and State as well,
temporarily)6 James Monroe appointed Clark, along
with Illinois Territorial governor Ninian Edwards
and St. Louis fur czar Auguste Chouteau, to bring
together the pro-British tribes and lay down the
law in new treaties. But Black Hawk’s group of
Sauks didn’t show up. Clark was furious, fuming
to Washington that “[t]he conduct of those savages,
in the cold indifference with which they received
several communications in regard to the late treaty,
. . . together with the suggestions and admonitions
of the British officers themselves, to be on our guard
against them, leave no doubt on our mind that it is
the intention of those tribes to continue the war, and
that nothing less than a vigorous display of military
force can change their disposition.”7 Threats and illwill finally led to their coming to St. Louis to sign the
treaty with the Red-Headed Chief the following year.8
In the 1816 treaty, the Rock River Sauks “do hereby
unconditionally assent to recognize, re-establish,

John Reynolds (1788–1865) became governor of Illinois in
1830. He was responsible for calling out the Illinois state
militia and took active command of it in Black Hawk’s War.
To reward his efforts, President Andrew Jackson named him
a major-general. He resigned as governor in 1834 when he
was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. (Image:
Portrait and Biographical Album of Whiteside County,
Illinois, 1887)

and confirm the treaty” of 1804, but without any
reference to its terms.9 As far as the Americans were
concerned, the Sauks were merely guests on the land
along Rock River until white folks moved in.
Some, like Keokuk and most of the Mesquakies,
saw the writing on the wall in the 1820s and began
migrating westward across the Mississippi. Others,
like Black Hawk, refused to recognize the land
cession and remained, saying that the original treaty
was signed without the consent of the tribe; besides
he argued, by not accepting annuities, they were
not giving up their homeland. American expansion
pushed more Native Americans westward so that
more Indians were living in and competing with
more Indians in less space, leading to heightened
competition with both one another and with tribes
farther west like the Sioux. The United States saw
this competition as a low-budget way to control the
tribes, keeping any one from getting too large and
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strong, since the army was shrunken so small that it
could not police the frontier itself. 10 So, when whites
began moving to northwestern Illinois to farm and
mine lead on the same land, the situation became
even more volatile.
By decade’s end, Clark made sure that the Sauks
knew it was time to move; some did so as ordered,
others did not. Clark was still exhibiting his typical
patience in 1829, telling Indian Superintendent
Thomas McKenney that the Sauks who remained
held “the opinion that they have been defrauded of
an immensely valuable Country,” and that being
removed with such a small annuity “produces
unfriendly feelings, particularly among those who
are under British influence,” which was bound to
create problems with the fast-encroaching whites.
Perhaps, Clark suggested, the United States should
meet with the chiefs and try to work out a new
treaty with a timetable for moving that both sides
found workable.11 After all, he told war secretary
John Eaton, “no power is vested in me to stop the
progress of settlements on ceded land, and I possess
no other means of enticing the Indians to move
than persuasion,” which would require substantial
presents. Worse yet, Clark said, the hard feelings
were unnecessary since “[t]he encroachments of
the whites in this instance is to be regretted, as the
removal of those Indians would have most probably
been effected in the course of the next year. Other
Tribes complain of the encroachments of the whites
and on that subject, a general discontent appears to
prevail among the Tribes of the state of Illinois.”12
Federal land around Saukenuk went up for sale
in September 1829, and settlers began moving in.
Keokuk proved unable to persuade Black Hawk and
his followers to vacate as they continued to farm the
land themselves. About three dozen settlers wrote to
Illinois governor John Reynolds for help. Some six or
seven hundred Sauks from “the Black Hawk’s party”
were nearby, reportedly destroying fences and wheat,
taking land, threatening settlers trying to plant spring
crops, and accusing settlers of stealing tribal lands.13
Reynolds apprised Clark of the predicament and
suggested “perhaps, a request from you to them for
them to remove to the west side of the river would
effect the object of procuring peace to the citizens of
the State.”14 Or, Clark responded, perhaps not, saying
that “every effort on my part has been made to effect
the removal from Illinois of all the Tribes who have
ceded their Lands.”15 The same day, Clark wrote to
Gen. Edmund Gaines, commander in the region, to
say that it was time to make good on the threats of
military intervention against the recalcitrant bands.16
Clark remained committed to the idea of civilizing
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Gen. Edmund P. Gaines (1777–1849) was a veteran of
the War of 1812 and, later, commander of the Western
Military Department at the time of Black Hawk’s War. He
was perhaps most famous in his lifetime for having arrested
former vice president Aaron Burr and testified in his treason
trial. (Image: National Archives)

cooperative Indians, though, and told Gaines to take
care to not harm those who “have constantly and
zealously cooperated with the Government Agents.”17
Within a week, Gaines met with Sauk leaders
over the issue. Illinois land was not theirs and had
not been since 1804, Gaines explained (echoing the
arguments Clark sent him). Jumping Fish said he had
sold enough to free a brave in 1805, but certainly
not such a swath as that.18 Gaines’s meeting with
the volatile Black Hawk went even less smoothly.
The Great Spirit placed the Sauk on the land, the
warrior said, and he intended to stay, then exploded,
“You asked, ‘Who I am’—I am a Sauk; my fathers
were great men, and I wish to remain where the
bones of my fathers are laid.” 19 Later, Black Hawk
tried to argue that the Sauks received nothing for
their cessions in treaties. With exasperation clearly
mounting, Clark reported to Cass that Black Hawk
didn’t have a leg to stand on this time. “The treaties
referred to [1804, 1816, and 1824] have been
frequently explained to the Sacs and Foxes,” Clark
fumed, “and [one] of which (the 13th of May 1816)
was signed by Black Hawk himself, the principal

Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied (1782–1867) was
a German prince who had a great interest in ethnology
and the natural world. He had explored in South America
in the 1820s and published his findings, and he traveled
to the United States in 1832 to explore and describe the
upper Missouri River. Before leaving for the upper Missouri
in March 1833, Maximilian sat in on the negotiations
between Clark and Keokuk at Clark’s meeting house; his
description of the summit is the most complete record of the
meeting extant. After returning to St. Louis in the spring of
1834, he traveled back to Germany and wrote his Travels
into the Interior of North America. Artist Karl Bodmer, who
Maximilan hired to join him, painted some 88 illustrations
for it. (Image: Qualitat fur Menschen)

Man of the party who signed the treaty. They have
been frequently told by myself and their Agent, that
they must move to their own land on the West side of
the Mississippi and assured that if done so peaceably
that assistance would be offered them. They however
persisted in their refusal to move and settled within
their own Country.”20 Keokuk tried to smooth things
over the following day, but Gaines wanted none of
it; the Sauks had to leave right away, and abandon
the corn they had planted. In fact, he said, he would
even replace the harvest, but Keokuk had to get his
people out of Illinois or suffer the consequences.
The arrival of some 1,400 Illinois Militia in late June
made it easier for Gaines to bully the Sauks into

signing “Articles of Agreement and Capitulation,”
filled with language designed to leave Native
Americans feeling both defeated and humiliated:
They had tried to destroy settlers’ homes and farms
and tried to orchestrate other tribes in the region to
fight removal, but their “being convinced that such
a war would tend speedily to annihilate them, they
have voluntarily abandoned their hostile attitude and
have sued for peace.” The terms of the agreement
read as those that could only have been dictated by
vengeful victors: permanent submission to American
authority, ending any communication with British or
unlicensed traders, allowing the Americans to build
and use roads through their lands whose boundaries
were ostensibly guaranteed. Left with little choice,
Black Hawk touched the quill to the paper.21 Clark
supported—even applauded—Gaines’s approach,
saying the Sauks had been “insolent,” but “[t]his
show of force, with the cool and determined course
pursued towards this disaffected Band of Sacs has
produced the desired effect, and I have no doubt
will tend to convince the disaffected parts of Tribes
on this frontier of the folly of their opposition to the
U. States without a just cause.”22 When the Sauks
traveled west for their annual winter hunt, many
hoped that none would return to Saukenuk.
Reports in late winter of 1832 suggested
otherwise. Clark received word from the region
that much was happening. Still, as late as early
April, Clark thought a war could be averted; Gen.
Henry Atkinson had already left for Rock Island
via steamboat in hopes of intercepting the Sauks
crossing the river to convince them to return west.23
But such was not to be; Black Hawk had mustered
together some 600 warriors, and “the arrival of the
Troops seems to have considerable affected on the
friendly Indians, but it appears, that nothing short
of force of Arms, will deter the British band from
their purpose.”24 That was it; Clark was ready to
settle the issue once and for all, seething to War
Secretary Lewis Cass, “I am fully of the opinion that
a very considerable force, and properly concerted
measures, will be indispensably necessary to
drive those hostile bands from the lands they have
invaded. . . . I am inclined to the belief that those
Indians have well merited a severe chastisement;
and would respectfully recommend the adoption of
such measures as would ensure to the offenders such
a degree of punishment as might be not only useful
to themselves hereafter, but which would serve as a
warning to others.” 25
Events accelerated quickly. Keokuk denied
responsibility for Black Hawk’s actions to Atkinson,
then skedaddled to St. Louis to express fear to Clark
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Hundreds of Sauk and Fox men, women, and children died at the Battle of Bad Axe on August 1 and 2, 1832, many in
the river trying to escape. It ended conflict between the United States military and the tribes in the Michigan and Illinois
territories. Most historians today characterize it as a massacre. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

that the Americans would take out their anger on
his peaceful—and cooperative—people. Relying
on reports from both military leaders and Clark,
Lewis Cass threatened “a general Indian war,”
saying that no one less than Andrew Jackson himself
had authorized war against Black Hawk and his
followers. Clark agreed heartily, telling Cass that
“it [is] highly gratifying, inasmuch as it develops the
determination of the Government in relation to the
war in which we are now involved with blood thirsty
and ferocious savages. The faithless and treacherous
character of those at the head of our Indian enemies
appears now to be so well known and understood,
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as to permit an expression of the hope, that their
wanton cruelties will eventually result in their own
destruction; and as they have afforded sufficient
evidence not only of their entire disregard of Treaties,
but also of their deep-rooted hostility, in shedding
the blood of our women and children, a War of
Extermination should be waged against them. The
honor and respectability of the Government require
this:—the peace and quiet of the frontier, the lives
and safety of its inhabitants demand it.”26
But Clark also covered for his ally, Keokuk,
assuring Cass the problem was an isolated one, and
that once Black Hawk was out of the way, removal

Gen. Henry Atkinson (1782–1842) had a long career
working with western tribes as an emissary of the
United States government. He led two expeditions to the
Yellowstone River (in 1819 and 1825) and signed treaties
of friendship with a number of tribes in the upper Great
Plains. Given his experience, Atkinson was named to the
general command of the army during Black Hawk’s War,
for which he was criticized. (Image: Abraham Lincoln
Presidential Library and Museum)

and civilization of the Sauks could proceed. At
last, the hunger for land forced the two men—who
reputedly knew and cared more about western
Indians than any other whites—to resort to force.27
Jackson himself gave the final orders to end the
problem once and for all in mid-June.28 The army
spent the next two months chasing Black Hawk
and his followers around northwestern Illinois
and southeastern Wisconsin until finally cornering
them at Bad Axe Creek, slaughtering hundreds, and
capturing Black Hawk and his fellow leaders for
return to the prison at Jefferson Barracks.
While all this was taking place, Clark and
Cass worked to cement the loyalty of the rest of
the Sauks in Iowa. Clark authorized 40,000 rations
of provisions for “friendly Indians as may seek
protection within the Indian agencies” in early July.29
Soon after, he asked the war department to sign off
on giving a blacksmith, gunsmith, and “assistance
for Agriculture” to the friendly Sauks, Mesquakies,
and Ioways who complied with American wishes,
since they “will imperiously require some assistance
in early preparations for agriculture.”30 A month
later, Clark wrote to Lewis Cass with preliminary

reports from the war; it appeared to be almost over.31
Soon after, Clark left St. Louis for Rock Island to
provide “aid of his advice and experience in certain
contemplated arrangements with the Indians in that
quarter” in preparation for the treaty talks scheduled
for that fall.32
It is often hard to tell when one is standing
on the precipice of change. If William Clark
thought so, he never wrote it down. Black Hawk
returned from Washington defeated and convinced
that Jackson was right—the Americans were as
many as the leaves in the forest. From Keokuk’s
standpoint, a new realpolitik was emerging where
he would not be challenged by the likes of Black
Hawk as he sought ways to work in the emerging
order with the Americans. Now, though, the United
States confirmed that it would do most anything to
facilitate westward expansion—even bring out the
military against Native Americans—and that a more
Jacksonian view of Indian removal had become the
order of the day. But when they stood in that prison at
Jefferson Barracks, they all straddled a time of great
change.
Keokuk (1767–1848) was a Sauk leader in Illinois and
the Iowa Territory. Unlike Black Hawk, Keokuk was willing
to work with American officials. In September 1832,
Keokuk headed a delegation that traveled to St. Louis to
try to negotiate Black Hawk’s release from imprisonment at
Jefferson Barracks. (Image: National Museum of American
Art)

Fall/Winter 2016–2017 | The Confluence | 11

E N D N O T E S
Anthony F. C. Wallace, Prelude to Disaster: The Course
of Indian-White Relations Which Led to the Black Hawk
War of 1832 (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1970), 19.
2
William Thomas Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 228, for map
of Sauk and Fox land cessions.
3
Wallace, Prelude to Disaster, 20–21.
4
Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties
(Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Electronic Publishing Center); Wallace, Prelude to Disaster, 17.
5
Wallace, Prelude to Disaster, 20–21.
6
Monroe, already Secretary of State, took over the War
Department when Madison fired John Armstrong after
Great Britain’s attack and sacking of Washington, D.C.
He only held the job until early March 1815; William
Crawford became Secretary of War the following August.
7
Extract of a [second] letter from Messrs Clark, Edwards,
and Chouteau, Commissioners for treating with the
Indians, dated St. Louis, 22d May 1815; MHS, Native
American Coll, b1 f4.
8
A delegation of Sauks did attend and sign a treaty in
September 1815, which was signed by (among others)
Quashquammee (Jumping Fish), who also signed the
1804 treaty. See Kappler, 121.
9
“Treaty with the Sauk, 1816,” Kappler, 127.
10
Kerry Trask, Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of
America (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), 24–27.
11
William Clark to McKenney, 20 May 1829, Kansas Historical Society, Records of the United States Superintendency of Indian Affairs, St. Louis, MO; v. 4, KHS Sup.
Letterbook, 9–11.Hereafter KHS Sup. Letterbook. In
fact, Clark reported that the British were responsible for
sowing the seeds of discontent by convincing the Sauks
that their annuity was far too small for the vast territory
they were ceding.
12
William Clark to sec of war 1 June 1829, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 12-13.
13
Citizens of Rock River to John Reynolds, 30 April
1831, The Black Hawk War, 1831–1832, vol. 2: Letters
and Papers, Part I, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. 36; compiled and edited by Ellen M.
Whitney (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library,
1973), 3. Hereafter Whitney, Black Hawk War.
14
Reynolds to Clark, 26 May 1831, Whitney, Black Hawk
War, 13.
15
Clark to Reynolds, 28 May 1831, ibid., 19–20.
16
Clark to Gaines, 28 May 1831, ibid., 16–17.
17
Clark to Gaines, 28 May 1831, ibid., 16–17.
18
Memorandum of Talks between Edmund P. Gaines and
the Sauk, Rock Island, June 4, 5, 6, 7 1831, ibid., 27–28,
quote on 28. The original meeting in 1804 was instigated
to settle the matter of a Sauk brave murdering a white
settler, who had then been captured. Ironically, the brave
was never released; American soldiers shot him in an
1

12 | The Confluence | Fall/Winter 2016–2017

19

20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30
31
32

escape attempt in 1805. See Territorial Papers 13, 165.
Memorandum of Talks between Edmund P. Gaines and
the Sauk, Rock Island, June 4, 5, 6, 7 1831, Whitney,
Black Hawk War, 29.
William Clark to Lewis Cass Sec of War, 12 August
1831, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 248–49.
“Articles of Agreement and Capitulation between the
United States and the Sauk and Fox,” 30 June 1831,
Whitney, Black Hawk War, 85–87.
William Clark to John Eaton, 6 July 1831, ibid., 102,
Clark to Herring, 10 April 1832, ibid., 85–87; William
Clark to John Eaton, 6 July 1831, ibid., 244.
Felix St. Vrain to William Clark, 18 April 1832, ibid.,
277–78.
William Clark to Lewis Cass, 20 April 1832, KHS Sup.
Letterbook, 356–57.
William Clark to Lewis Cass, 8 June 1832, Whitney,
Black Hawk War, 550.
William Clark to Lewis Cass, 8 June 1832, ibid., 550.
“John Robb to Andrew Jackson and Jackson’s reply,” 12
June 1832, ibid., 579–80.
William Clark to Lewis Cass, 2 July 1832, KHS Sup.
Letterbook, 385–86. Cass ltr of 19 June notifying him of
congressional act “for the relief of such friendly Indians
as may seek protection within the Indian Agencies.”
Passed June 15, section 4 allocating $20K; see Register
of Debates in Congress, 22d Cong, 1st session, v. 8, pt.
3, app., p. xviii; in ibid., 630.
William Clark to Elbert Herring, 19 July 1832, KHS
Sup. Letterbook, 393–94.
William Clark to Lewis Cass, 9 August, 1832, ibid.,
404.
John Ruland (Sub Agent Indian Affairs) to Elbert Herring, 24 August 1832, ibid., 406–7.

